A Regime Switching Explanation of the Reactions of Market Participant  during the Crisis by FAKHRY, Bachar
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 3                            September 2016                            Issue 3 
 
A Regime Switching Explanation of the Reactions of 






Abstract. Empirical evidence suggest that markets are too volatile to be efficient, essentially this 
means the influencing factor in the pricing of assets is the reaction of market participants to the 
information or events, rather than the actual information. Hence in order to understand the pricing of 
assets, there is a need to include the behavioural finance theory. An influencing observation during 
the recent financial and sovereign debt crises as well as the pre-crisis period is that market 
participants seem to be reacting to the general financial environment. We use the SWARCH model of 
Cai (1994) to analyse the reaction of market participants in six key sovereign debt markets (i.e. US, 
German, Greek, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese) in a fast changing and highly volatile environment. 
In general, the evidence seems to be pointing at a change in the reaction of the market participants 
reflecting the underlying fast changing and highly volatile environment. 
Keywords. Overreaction/Underreaction Hypothesis, Regime Switching, SWARCH, Sovereign Debt 
Market, Crises. 
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1. Introduction 
 criticism often put against the efficient market hypothesis is that market 
participants are homo-sapiens and not homo economics (De Bondt et al., 
2008 and Kourtidis et al., 2011).  Hence, in order to address this criticism 
there is a requirement to understand the psychology of the market participants.  
This led to the alternative theory of behavioural finance advocated by Statman 
(2008) and Subrahmanyam (2007) amongst others. A key notion in the behavioural 
finance theory as Bernard Baruch states: 
“What is important in market fluctuations are not the events themselves, but 
the human reactions to those events” as quoted by Lee et al. (2002, p. 2277). 
As illustrated in Fakhry & Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016), one of the 
issues is the price tend to deviate from the fundamental value. As with the 
comment from Bernard Baruch, the key to understanding this deviation is the 
market participants’ reactions.  This lends itself to the overreaction / underreaction 
hypothesis as suggested by Barberis et al. (1998) and De Bondt (2000). 
However, on some occasions there can be the appearance of multiple bubbles 
occurring over a short duration. This periodic collapse in a bubble can be analysed 
thru the use of a Markov process as alluded by Blanchard & Watson (1982), Evans 
(1991) and recently Branch & Evans (2011); this can be modelled by the use of the 
Markov Switching models (Hamilton, 1988). A related issue raised by Fakhry & 
Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016) is the reaction of the market participants 
seem to depend on the general market environment. Hence, we proposed using the 
SWARCH model of Cai (1994) to explain the reaction of the market participants 
during the recent financial and sovereign debt crisis as well as the pre-crisis period.    
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As we are analysing the possibility of using a regime-switching model to explain 
the overreaction and underreaction hypothesis, we start this paper with two short 
reviews of the overreaction//underreaction hypothesis and Markov regime 
switching ARCH models. The next section gives the methodology of the SWRCH 
model used. Section 5 and 6 presents the data and empirical results. Finally, section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. The Overreaction / Underreaction Hypothesis 
A key assumption of the efficient market hypothesis is that current prices 
should fully reflect all information on the asset as hinted by Fama (1965) and 
Malkiel (1962). There is an issue with this statement in that the current price 
reflects the sentiment of the market participants with respect to the information as 
suggested by De Bondt (2000) and Daniel et al. (1998) among others.  Therein lays 
the key to understanding the overreaction / underreaction hypothesis (as hinted by 
Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong & Stein, 1999 and De Bondt, 2000); 
since market participants have different perspectives on how to interpret the new 
information, therefore the price could deviate from the fundamental value.  
Essentially, as hinted by De Bondt (2000), the overreaction hypothesis states that 
sometimes market participants tend to disproportionately react to information 
(fundamental and news) causing a temporarily and dramatic deviation from the 
fundamental value.  Usually the price does revert to the fundamental value within a 
short period as market participants digest the information. 
In essence, according to De Bondt (2000), most overreactions are due to errors 
in market participants’ forecasts. A common issue is that market participants are 
often upbeat during bull markets and gloomy during bear markets, this is reflected 
in their perspectives of the asset price. Another issue is the problem of 
overestimation of the information on the asset during the issuance or initial public 
offering stage by the agents. According to Barberis et al. (1998), a key factor in the 
overreaction hypothesis is that a sequence of good or bad news can lead to an 
overreaction by market participants assuming the continuation of the trend. Daniel 
et al. (1998) suggest there is a differentiation based on whether the information is 
public or private. Thus meaning market participant are overconfident in their 
private information leading to an overreaction in the market. Whilst in general they 
tend to underreact to public information. Moreover, as discussed in Barberis et al. 
(1998) the evidence seems to be pointing at some market participants’ conservative 
attitude to updating the model incurring the underreaction hypothesis. 
However, as Hong & Stein (1999) highlight it is essential to analyse the 
interaction between heterogeneous market participants. They analyse two types of 
bounded rational market participants: momentum traders and news watchers to 
illustrate the effects on one another both types have. The results seem to be 
suggesting that when news watchers pick up new information, in general they 
underreact. This is mainly due to the gradual diffusing of information and the 
assumption that they do not observe prices. When short run momentum traders 
enter the market, seeing a chance to profit, instead of pushing the price back 
towards the fundamental value, they cause an overreaction to the news. While in 
the short run market participants could make a profit, in the long-run they make 
losses due to the price exceeding the long run equilibrium price. According to 
Hong & Stein (1999), the inclusion of well-informed fully rational arbitrageurs 
does not eliminate the effects of other less informed and rational market 
participants.  Thus meaning the overreaction continues to have an impact on the 
price. 
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Recent empirical evidence has painted a mixed picture for the 
overreaction/underreaction hypothesis. Spyrou et al. (2007) find a split between 
large and small capitalization stocks in the London Stock Exchange. Large 
capitalization stocks were consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, while 
medium to small capitalization stocks seem to underreact to news shocks for many 
days.  This underreaction is unexplained by risk factors or any other known effect. 
A relevant factor raised by Fakhry & Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016) 
regarding the efficient market hypothesis is that during some highly volatile 
periods some markets seem to be rejecting the null hypothesis of the market being 
too volatile to be efficient. As hinted by Kirchler (2009), the underreaction / 
overreaction hypothesis provides one possible explanation, which suggests that 
market participants’ reaction leads to overvaluation or undervaluation during bulls 
or bears market respectively. Hence, a highly volatile period with instances of both 
a bear and bull market would give the impression of an efficient market.   
However, contrary to Spyrou et al. (2007), Lobe & Rieks (2011) find significant 
evidence of short-term overreaction in the Frankfurt stock exchange is not limited 
to small capitalization stocks. The explanation seems to be in the anomalies and 
stock characteristics. However, transaction costs and unpredictable markets mean 
that market participants may not be able to exploit these effects. This means that 
due to the unforeseeable direction of the reaction and the existence of transaction 
costs prohibiting the implementation of consistent profit making strategies, they 
conclude the evidence seem to be suggesting no violation of the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
 
3. A Review of the Markov Regime-Switching ARCH 
Models 
As stated by Hamilton (1989) the basis of a number of previous researches 
studying the relationship between the business cycle and GNP is the assumption of 
the observed data following a linear stationary process. However, as a number of 
studies have proved the assumption of linearity and stationary in key 
macroeconomic datasets is weak. Hence, in an article on non-stationary time series 
and the business cycle, Hamilton (1989) introduced a regime-switching model 
based on autoregression using a discrete-state Markov process.   
Conversely, it has long been acknowledged financial markets sometimes go thru 
alternate periods, characterized by high and low volatilities as noted by Hamilton 
& Susmel (1994) and Cai (1994) amongst others and highlighted by Fakhry & 
Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. (2016). In researching monthly short-term interest 
rates, Hamilton (1988) concludes the possible present of regime shifts in ARCH 
effects could explain the estimates of the ARCH-m of Engle et al. (1987). In fact, a 
common problem in the estimation of ARCH/GARCH is spuriously high persistent 
of volatility across subsamples as noted by Hamilton & Susmel (1994). Diebold 
(1986) and Lamoureux & Lastrapes (1990) argue that structural changes in the 
observed dataset could be the reason for a high estimate of the ARCH/GARCH 
parameter, which leads to high persistent. 
Thus meaning that sometimes, simple ARCH/GARCH models do not entirely 
explain volatility, there is a need to combine the regime-switching capabilities of 
the Markov switching model with conditional volatility models such as 
ARCH/GARCH. As noted by Cai (1994), a key factor in the use of SWARCH is 
the endogenisation of parameter shifts, thus allowing shifts to be determined by the 
observed dataset.  Additionally, a key advantage is that it distinguishes between the 
effects enabling the analysis of their impact on the properties of the observed 
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dataset.  This led to a number of integrated models generally called SWARCH, i.e. 
Cai (1994), Hamilton & Susmel (1994) and Hamilton & Lin (1996).   
Although the models of Cai (1994) and Hamilton & Susmel (1994) are based on 
SWARCH implementation, they adopt different methods of implementation. Cai 
(1994) models the shifts in the asymptotic long-run variance of the SWARCH 
process. Thus in this model the intercept of the conditional variance is allowed to 
change in response to the discrete shifts in the regimes. Whereas Hamilton & 
Susmel (1994) model the shifts in the dynamic process of the conditional variance, 
this means that the basis of the regime shifts are the changes in the scales of the 
conditional variance. 
The literature on the empirical evident of the SWARCH in the sovereign debt 
market is not a huge one in comparison with other models. Although the Markov 
switching and GARCH models separately have been the focus of attention since 
the financial and sovereign debt crises, yet there is a drought in the empirical 
evident of the SWARCH model. We find a two way split in the evident with a 
group, such as Christiansen (2008), researching the yields and the second group 
such as Abdymomunov (2013) studying the returns.  The significant of these two 
papers is that they also use different SWARCH implementations whereas 
Christiansen (2008) uses the Cai (1994) method; Abdymomunov (2013) uses the 
Hamilton & Susmel (1994) method. 
In a research on the relationship between the volatility on the short rate of the 
US and UK and the US and Germany, Christiansen (2008) extended the Cai (1994) 
implementation of the SWARCH model to a bivariate model in order to estimate 
both volatilities, i.e. US and UK and US and Germany, simultaneously. The 
research used the weekly 1-month Eurodollar, Libor and Euromark
1
 for the US, 
UK and Germany respectively; observed from January 1975 to December 2004 
obtained from the Federal Reserve and Datastream. They found the inclusion of the 
level effect and regime switching in the model seems to be rendering the ARCH 
effect in the conditional volatility insignificant.  In addition, the regime switching 
occurs in the level or constant in the ARCH model specification. Moreover, they 
find evident suggesting that neither a state dependant level nor volatility have an 
advantage over the other. The results seem to be indicating a mixed picture with 
each country short rate model conforming two different models with respect to the 
two states. However, there is a difference in the models each country conforms 
with respect to the states. There seem to be no evident of contagion between the US 
and Germany and US and UK. However, in general they did fund some evident of 
Granger causality. Essentially, this is suggesting that the ECB in particular can 
exert some influence on the Eurozone short rate volatility. 
In contrast, Abdymomunov (2013) extends the Hamilton & Susmel (1994) 
model to a multivariate SWARCH model; in a study on the impact of financial 
stress from abrupt and large changes in the volatility of key financial variables on 
the US financial. They use transformed weekly TED spreads, value-weighted 
NYSE returns and capital-weighted CDS from a number of banks as the financial 
variables obtained from various places such as Bloomberg and the FRED database 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis observed over the period 6 December 
2000 to 29 September 2010. However, the CDS data was observed between 10 
November 2004 and 29 September 2010. They find strong evident of the high 
volatility state in the joint variables mimicking times of financial stress such as the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, subprime crises and credit crunch in August 
2007 and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. The results seem to 
 
1 After the introduction of the Euro, the rate used was Eurocurrency 
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suggest that a possible indicator of financial stress could be the joint variables 
regime-switching model. 
 
4. Model Specifications for Markov Switching ARCH 
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the overreaction/underreaction by using 
the SWARCH model. The SWARCH model is basically a combination of the 
Markov switching model of Hamilton (1989) and the ARCH model of Engle 
(1982). Hamilton (1989) derived the MS(s)-AR (k) model from a combination of 
two or more first order autoregression models, each with a different intercept to 
highlight the change in the observed data at a certain time.  However, as indicated 
by Hamilton (2008) the problem with that was priori knowledge of abrupt changes 
in the observed data.  Hence, Hamilton (1989) introduced a multiple-state (i.e. two-
state in this case) Markov chain with a system of probabilities attached to each 
state to model the changes in the observed data regime. The Markov Switching 
model as derived by Hamilton (1989), illustrated in equation 1. 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜔𝑠𝑡 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡        
       (1) 
𝑠𝑡 =  
= 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒
= 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑕𝑖𝑔𝑕 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒
  
 
As previously stated, the literature and empirical evident on the Markov 
switching model in the sovereign debt market in the last few years have been 
strong, see (Georgoutsos & Migiakis, 2012, and Pozzi & Sadaba, 2013). Given the 
evidence of regime switching in the volatility of sovereign debt prices over the past 
few years, hence a volatility-switching model would help in identifying the 
reaction of market participants.  However, due to issues regarding the complexity, 
see (Cai, 1994) and (Guidolin, 2012), and the exaggerated high persistency in the 
volatility, see (Guidolin, 2012); we follow Christiansen (2008) and Abdymomunov 
(2013) in using a SWARCH model instead of a SWGRACH (i.e. Switching 
GARCH). In effect using the ARCH model of Engle (1982) to derive the volatility.  
Equation 2 uses a single lag ARCH model as proposed by Engle (1982). 
 
𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2  𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑕𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡
2      (2) 
 
The simplest method to estimate the integrated heteroskedasticity and switching 
effects in the volatility is by the use of a SWARCH model such as Hamilton & 
Susmel (1994) and Cai (1994). We opt for the Cai (1994) implementation mainly 
due to initial tests with our observed data raising a few estimation issues with 
respect to the Hamilton & Susmel (1994) implementation. In combining the 
Markov switching model as in equation 1 with the ARCH model in equation 2, it is 
easy to see how Cai (1994) integrated the two models. The Cai’s model is derived 
from the two equations, illustrated by equations 3 and 4, with the first equation 
being the integrated model and the second being the regime-switching 
probabilities. Analysing equation 3 closely reveals the beautiful simplicity in the 
construction of the model. Yet the model is powerful in its ability to model the 
regime switching in the volatility of the underlining observed dataset and 
complicated to estimate. The simplicity of the model is that it is a combination of 
the Hamilton (1989) Markov Switching model in equation 1 and ARCH model of 
Engle (1982) in equation 2 whereby the autoregression model in equation 1 is 
substituted by the conditional heteroskedasticity model as derived by equation 2.  
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However, since Cai (1994) uses a two-lagged ARCH model, this implies that the 
SWARCH model follows equation 3 
 
𝑕𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑠𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2𝑞
𝑖=1        (3) 
𝑠𝑡 =  
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑕𝑖𝑔𝑕 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
  
 
𝑃 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑖 𝜍𝑇   =  𝑃 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑖, 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑗 𝜍𝑇   
𝑀=2




1+𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝜃𝑚 ,𝑛  
       (5) 
 
In the Cai (1994) model, the intercept for the low volatility regime is 𝜔0 and the 
high volatility regime calculated by multiplying 𝜔0  with the coefficient of the 
ARCH.  Since the SWARCH model was originally proposed to highlight the issue 
of spuriously high persistence in the volatility of other models due to regime 
switching. 
In a two-regime Markov switching model, we calculate the expected 
probabilities by using 𝜃1,1  and 𝜃1,2  logistic indices. Equation 5 illustrates the 
calculation; a key factor is that we substitute 𝜃1,1 and 𝜃1,2 into 𝜃𝑛 ,𝑚  for the low and 
high regimes’ probabilities respectively. We opt for the smoothing effect to 
calculate the probabilities. This gives a more accurate figure of each probability, 
but requires extensive computing, due to the complex estimation method involving 
the entire history of filtered and predicted probabilities, see Hamilton (1994). 
 
5. Data Description 
As illustrated by Table 1, we use the daily 10-year sovereign debt, maturing in 
20120F
2
, end of day bid prices for Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and US 
obtained from Bloomberg.  Importantly, the reference numbers are ISIN for all the 
markets, except the US which uses CRSPID. In order to capture the price volatility 
during the sovereign debt crisis without the maturity effect, we extend our data to 
obtain a second group of sovereign bonds for the above-mentioned countries with 
the exception of Greece maturing in 2017 as illustrated in  
Table 2. We follow the norm by defining our week as Monday to Friday. In 
order to make the observed data uniformed across all six observed datasets, we 
substitute all missing observations with the last known price.  
 
Table 1. The 10-Year Sovereign Debt Prices Data with maturity in 2012 
 
Reference Number Download Date Issue Date Maturity Date 
German DE0001135192 16/07/2012 02/01/2002 31/12/2011 
Greece GR0124018525 17/12/2012 17/01/2002 18/05/2012 
Italy IT0003190912 16/07/2012 01/08/2001 01/02/2012 
Portugal PTOTEKOE0003 16/07/2012 12/06/2002 15/06/2012 
Spain ES0000012791  17/12/2012 14/05/2002 30/07/2012 
US 9128277L0 16/07/2012 15/02/2002 15/02/2012 
 
2 The exception is the German which matures at the end of 2011 
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Mainly due to the last issue date, that of Portugal, and first maturity date, that of 
Germany, our observed sample is from 1
st
 July 2002 to 30
th
 December 2011.  Thus 
meaning our sample has a uniformed total of 2,480 daily observations for each 
sovereign debt market. 
 
Table 2. The 10-Year Sovereign Debt Prices Data with maturity in 2017 
 Reference Number Download Date Issue Date Maturity Date 
German DE0001135317 08/04/2013 17/11/2006 04/01/2017 
Italy IT0004164775 08/04/2013 01/08/2006 01/02/2017 
Portugal PTOTELOE0010 08/04/2013 18/06/2007 16/10/2017 
Spain ES00000120J8 08/04/2013 23/01/2007 31/01/2017 
US 912828GH7 08/04/2013 15/02/2007 15/02/2017 
 
In our second observed sample, we follow the same concept as before by using 
the Portuguese issue date to set the start. This means our observed sample is from 
1
st
 July 2007 to 31
st
 March 2013, a total of 1,500 daily observations for each 
sovereign debt market. 
 
6. Empirical Evidence 
We use the Cai (1994) variant of the SWARCH model as indicated earlier to 
analyse the regime-switching behaviour of volatility in the sovereign debt market.  
We derive a single lagged two states SWARCH to model the switching conditional 
variance of the first order-differentiated price.  
In estimating our SWARCH model, we use the maximum likelihood with 
normal distribution. With the exception of the US and German 2017 datasets, we 
use the BHHH method. However, due to errors in the estimations of these two 
datasets, we opted to use the BFGS method. Due to errors with the estimations, we 
used various sample periods. 
 
Table 3. SWARCH Statistics of the 2012 Bond 
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 US Germany Greece Italy Portugal Spain 













Prs=1 8.95E-4 8.04E-3 1.24E-2 7.84E-3 2.09E-2 1.07E-2 
Prs=2 0.99957 0.99735 0.8637 0.99631 0.89702 0.99528 
Log Likelihood 187.0060 1097.174 -530.0750 837.6236 -91.3807 362.2630 
 
 
Figure 1. US 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
 
Figure 2: German 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
 
Figure 3: Greek 2012 High Volatility Regime 
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Figure 4: Italian 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
 
Figure 5: Portuguese 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
 
Figure 6: Spanish 2012 High Volatility Regime 
 
In essence, the 2012 bonds were associated with a period of changing market 
environment in the global financial market. Of course the later stages of the period 
were associated with the financial and sovereign debt crises, yet it was also 
governed by a number of events which changed the market environment during the 
earlier stages such as the asset price bubble and accountancy issues leading to the 
bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom. However, two events, which had an 
influential impact during the early stages, were the introduction of the euro and the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 leading to a number of wars. Although these 
two events occurred before the observed period, yet the persistency in their 
aftermath had a big impact on the behaviour of market participant.   
The evidence from figures 1 to 6 certainly points towards the existence of a 
regime-switching behaviour influencing the pattern of price volatility in the 
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sovereign debt market. While the figures illustrate the extent to which the 
sovereign debt market in general is highly volatile, further illustrated by analysing 
the probabilities of the high volatility regime in table 3, in essence regime 2.  
Surprisingly for our observed markets, this is highly significant with a minimum 
probability of 0.8637 as observed by the Greek market, backed by the probability 
for the low volatility regime, which is regime 1, with a maximum probability of 
0.0209 for the Portuguese market. This would suggest it is more likely that the next 
regime will be highly volatile. With the exception of the Greek and Portuguese 
markets, the probabilities are in the high 0.90s, which are hinting at the other 
observed markets being more volatile. Notably the Greek and Portuguese markets 
also point to a significant probability of a high volatility regime. 
In general, the ARCH intercepts seem to be hinting at a three way split in the 
markets. This is consistent with previous observation of the behaviour of volatility 
in the sovereign debt market, see Fakhry & Richter (2015) and Fakhry et al. 
(2016). The ARCH intercepts in both regimes for the Italian and Spanish markets 
seem to be hinting at very low levels of volatility, understandable as the high 
volatility did not impact the two markets until the later stages as illustrated by 
figures 4 and 6. Both these figures also illustrate that the highly volatile period of 
the early 2000s did not really influence the volatility levels. Arguably, the financial 
crisis did not affect the Spanish market until later on and the Italian market 
remained unaffected.   
The US and German markets seem to be portraying a more volatile market than 
the other observed markets. However, as illustrated by figures 1 and 2, at the 
highest level their volatilities are below the Greek and Portuguese markets. A 
counter argument is during some spells the level of volatility for the German and 
especially the US markets seem to be higher than the Greek and Portuguese 
markets. A possible explanation is the quality and liquidity factors of the US and 
German markets making them the benchmark markets for both the dollar and euro 
currencies. This makes them prime markets for flights to safety during crises or 
extreme events i.e. Knightian uncertainty. Another influencing factor with respect 
to both markets is the requirement of the Basel II regulations to hold sovereign debt 
on their balance sheets as capital. Hence, many of these organizations choose to 
hold either US or German sovereign debt depending on their “home” currency.   
The Greek and to a lesser extent Portuguese markets were in the “eye of the 
hurricane” during the sovereign debt crisis, hence the high levels of volatility, as 
illustrated by figures 3 and 5, which had an impact on the regime 2 ARCH 
intercepts. However, as the figures also illustrates there are long periods of low 
volatility in both the Greek and Portuguese markets. An influencing factor is that 
both these markets are not liquid and more importantly are not large markets.  
Hence, as illustrated by the figures, during “normal” market environment these 
markets do not have a high number of transactions, which gives the appearance of 
stable markets. 
In essence, the 2017 bonds are associated with a highly volatile period in the 
global financial market mainly due to the financial and ensuing sovereign debt 
crises. Although, this in itself is interesting, mainly due to the differing impact on 
the observed markets of each crisis; however, as hinted previously, another 
influencing factor is the different impact from the on the run and maturity effects 
on the financial and sovereign debt crises respectively. The final factor is the 
extended observed period; therefore, allowing us to analyse the full impact of the 




Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 3(3), B. Fakhry, p.434-449. 
444 
Table 4. SWARCH Statistics of the 2017 Bond 
















































































Prs=1 1.40E-3 3.63E-2 2.24E-2 3.45E-2 1.09E-2 
Prs=2 0.99926 0.98350 0.90602 0.85052 0.93523 
Log Likelihood -761.8270 -352.5236 -590.8467 -1242.7689 -749.8844 
 
 
Figure 7: US 2017 High Volatility Regime 
 
Figure 8: German 2017 High Volatility Regime 
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Figure 9: Italian 2017 High Volatility Regime 
 
 
Figure 10: Portuguese 2017 High Volatility Regime 
 
 
Figure 11: Spanish 2017 High Volatility Regime 
 
The evidence from table 4 is pointing at a mixed picture with respect to the 
probabilities. The high probability of regime 2 suggests that there is a significant 
probability of a highly volatile regime throughout our observed markets. With the 
exception of the Portuguese market, the observed markets are hinting at a 
significant probability of above 0.9 that the next regime is highly volatile. With the 
US and German markets approaching 1.0, this seem to be indicating that the US 
and German markets were highly volatile throughout the observed period, although 
the probabilities of both the Italian and Spanish markets were also significantly 
high.   
Like the probabilities, the ARCH intercept for regimes 1 and 2, points at a 
rather mixed picture in terms of the level of volatility in the observed markets. As 
illustrated by figures 7 to 11, it would seem that the German market had the lowest 
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level of volatility in both regimes. An influencing factor is that both crises did not 
really affect the German economy or financial market, despite the downgrading of 
the German sovereign debt ratings. However, the evidence from figure 8 seems to 
suggest that the market was highly volatile and backed by the high probability of 
regime 2 as hinted earlier. A possible explanation is the status of the German 
market as the benchmark market for the Eurozone; hence, the persistency of the 
high volatility regime is the result of flights to safety during both crises. Similarly, 
the persistency of the high volatility regime in the US market during the early 
stages was the result of a flight from financial assets to the US market during the 
financial crisis. Since the financial crisis had its origin in the US; hence, these 
flights to safety as illustrated by figure 7 significantly affected the US market.  
However, the timings of the two hikes in volatility during the sovereign debt crisis 
period seem to be hinting at the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, hence a plausible 
explanation is that the US market was at the centre of a flight from the euro to the 
US dollar.  It must be remembered that due to problems with the estimation of the 
SWARCH model, we had to limit our observed dataset to 1
st
 October 2012, which 
meant the full impact of the US fiscal cliff and debt-ceiling crises on the US market 
was not captured.   
To a certain extent figures 9 to 11 seem to be hinting at the limited impact of the 
financial crisis on the IPS markets. Although there is some evidence of high 
volatility regimes during the financial crisis period, yet this evidence seems to be 
telling. Certainly, the evidence seems to be pointing at jumps rather than changes 
in the volatility regime effecting these markets during the financial crisis, 
especially around the period of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. This seems to be 
hinting at a period of reactive behaviour by the market participants to events during 
the financial crisis period. However, during the sovereign debt crisis, the regime 
changes became increasingly persistence and frequent. An interesting factor is the 
lag between the Greek deficit revision and the reaction of the market participants 
leading to contagion in the IPS markets.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we used the SWARCH model volatility regime switching 
proposed by Cai (1994) to analyse the reaction of the market participants in a fast 
changing and highly volatile environment. In order to overcome the “on the run” 
and maturity effects, we used two group of government bonds: the 2012 bonds and 
2017 bonds. We used the prices of the GIPS plus US and German markets. The 
aim was to analyse the changing reaction of the market participants during the pre-
crisis period and the financial and sovereign debt crises. 
In summarising, the SWARCH model seems to point to a regime-switching 
behaviour in the price volatility of the sovereign debt market. In general, the high 
volatility regime in both the 2012 and 2017 bonds governed the SWARCH model. 
The SWARCH model also seems to highlight an interesting factor in the 2012 
bonds, the observed markets seem to be generally divided into three groups 
depending on the pattern of the volatility and regimes: the US/German, 
Greek/Portuguese and Italian/Spanish markets. Another factor observed in the 
patterns of volatility in the 2017 bonds is that the IPS markets do follow a similar 
pattern of volatility while the US and German markets seem to be dictated by 
individual patterns of volatility. A relevant factor in our research is that the 
SWARCH model seems to be identifying the changing environment for each of the 
observed markets. Since each of the markets was effected by a number of different 
factors. 
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In concluding, the evidence does hint at the changing environment effecting the 
market participants’ reactions. Thus indicating an overreaction/underreaction 
during both crises in the sovereign debt market. However, there was evidence of 
underreaction during the pre-crisis asset bubble and to a certain extent the financial 
crisis, since the macroeconomic indicators were indicating the worsening 
underlying economic condition in the observed markets. 
A big issue is that market participants also react to policy makers; the problem 
is that during both crises the policy makers were also reacting to events. At the 
heart of both crises there was confusions bought on by mixed political 
communications. These two issues illustrate a genuine lack of ideas and agreement 
by the policy makers leading to an overreaction. Another issue is both crises were 
highlighted by incomplete or asymmetrical information. The sad thing was that the 
spillover effect that followed the initial crises was a consequent of the overreaction 
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